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THE INFLUENCE OF INTERVENING CONDITIONS ON THE 
OVER- AND UNDERESTIMATION OF RISK 
Dr. Elmar Kutsch, Lecturer in Operations Management, The School of Management, 
University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, Tel.: 01483-68-3094, E-Mail: 
e.kutsch@surrey.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT 
Project risk management is the systematic utilisation of a process by project managers to identify, 
analyse and respond to risks posed by events and conditions that are not definitely known in advance 
but which may adversely affect IT project success. However, although best practice standards in 
project risk management are applied in information technology (IT) project management, IT project 
managers seem unable to accurately predict and manage risk. Thus, this study aims to investigate the 
extent to which project managers in IT project over- and underestimate risk and to what degree their 
failure in accurately managing risks influences is caused by risk related factors. Findings indicate that 
project managers tend to considerably under- and overestimate risk. The underestimation of risk is 
found to have been caused by factors such as lack of knowledge or the preference to wait until risk 
materialises. An important implication of the research is that the prevention of these causative risk 
related factors may enable IT projects to increase the accurateness of their predictions regarding 
project risk and subsequently to increase the effectiveness of project risk management. 
Keywords: Project Management, Risk, Effectiveness  
1. INTRODUCTION 
A project is an undertaking to create something that does not yet exist (Young, 1998), ideally with a 
defined scope which needs to be delivered in a defined time at an agreed cost (Buttrick, 1997). 
Projects may be considered to have failed when expected scope, cost and time targets are not met, 
expected benefits are not realised, or a stakeholder is dissatisfied with an aspect of the process or 
outcome. In particular IT projects, the provision of a service to implement systems and solutions, 
including a variety of hardware and software products (Howard, 2001), have a high rate of failure 
(McGrew & Bilotta, 2000; Whittaker, 1999). According to practitioners surveyed by Whittaker 
(1999), IT project failure is most commonly attributed to lack of top management involvement, a weak 
business case and inadequate risk management. The primary contributing factor to project failure was 
identified as project risk management (Whittaker, 1999). Project risk management is the systematic 
process of identifying, analysing, and responding to risks as project related events or conditions which 
are not definitely known, but have the potential to adversely affect a project objective (Project 
Management Institute, 2000). Despite the use of well established and accepted project risk 
management processes such as PMI 2000, Prince 2 or PRAM, project managers commonly perceive 
these processes as not effective for managing project uncertainties (Pender, 2001; Whittaker, 1999). 
Research has shown that individuals misestimate risks (e.g. Estrada, 2000). Individuals may under- 
and overestimate risks and may take precautions with respect to risks that do not materialise as 
predicted. However, there is little agreement as to what extent individuals, in particular project 
managers in the IT industry, under- or overestimate risk and what factors drive the discrepancy 
between planned and materialised risk. This study builds upon prior work on risk related conditions 
such as lack of knowledge which constrain the effective management of project risk. It examines the 
influence of theses specific conditions on the extent to which IT project manger’s misestimate project 
risk. 
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2. THE CURRENT SUCCESS RATE OF IT PROJECTS 
The various statistics on the outcome of IT projects indicate that projects generally tend not to be 
completed on time or on budget (Kartam & Kartam, 2001; Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil, & Cule, 2001; 
The Standish Group International Inc., 2004). One survey revealed, that only twenty-six percent of all 
IT development projects are on time and budget (Hormozi, McMinn, & Nzeogwu, 2000). The 
TechRepublic Study by the Gartner Group shows a similar picture. In 2000, 1,275 North American IT 
specialists were asked about the outcome of internal IT projects. The analysis of the data showed that 
forty percent of all IT projects were considered to have failed. The projects considered to have failed, 
by the Gartner Group, were on average suspended after fourteen weeks and at which time 
approximately $1,000,000 had on average been invested. Whittaker (1999, p. 29) argued: 
“(Inadequate) risk management remains the highest ranked factor contributing to project failure, …”. 
3. ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF BEST PRACTICE PROJECT RISK 
MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 
The basic structure of ‘best practice’ project risk management processes in IT-project management 
does not differ significantly between those established by the British Standards Institution (British 
Standards Institution, 2000), The Government Centre for Information Systems (CCTA - The UK 
Government Centre for Information Systems, 1995) or the U.K. Association for Project Management 
(Chapman, 1997; Chapman & Ward, 2000) (Gaulke, 2002). Regardless of the number of phases and 
definition of phases the processes have one activity in common: “an activity that deals with planning 
actions that will be implemented in order to reduce the exposure to risk” (Ben-David & Raz, 2001, p. 
14). 
All the project risk management processes aforementioned heavily rely on planning. Three 
components of risks are planned before any actions are taken: threat, consequence, and the modifying 
factor (response). A threat (a source of danger) may, for example, be environmental turbulence (i.e. 
constantly changing, highly uncertain and ambiguous), which could have adverse results on resources. 
Resources are components of a project such as budget, personnel and material that could be affected 
by threats (Burghardt, 1995). Consequences relate to the potential of risk to negatively influence on 
the project outcome (Project Management Institute, 2000). Risk can lead to losses that range from 
trivial to large (Crockford, 1986). Modifying factors increase or decrease the likelihood of its threat 
becoming a reality or the probable consequence of such a reality. A project manager may modify or 
change risk by reducing the likelihood of a threat to materialise or the severity of its consequences or 
both through executing response actions. 
The result of risk processes such as those defined by the PMI (Project Management Institute, 2004) 
and CCTA (CCTA - The UK Government Centre for Information Systems, 1995) is a decision based 
on the expected utility of different choices (Ekenberg, Boman, & Linnerooth-Bayer, 2001; Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979; Pender, 2001). Expected utility is “a weighted average of the utilities of all the 
possible outcomes that could flow from a particular decision, where higher-probability outcomes 
count more than lower-probability outcomes in calculating the average” (Borge, 2001, p. 21). The 
utility of decision making choices are weighted by their probabilities and outcomes (Arrow, 1983; 
Borge, 2001; Kahneman et al., 1979). Expected utility theory (EUT) has generally been accepted in 
risk literature as a model of rational choice for taking risky decisions (Anand, 1993; Borge, 2001; 
Jaeger, Renn, Rosa, & Wehler, 2001; Kahneman et al., 1979) and is considered a very fruitful 
framework for decision-making under risk (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). Rationality can be defined as 
“agreeable to reason; not absurd, preposterous, extravagant, foolish, fanciful, or the like; intelligent, 
sensible” (Simon, 1978, p. 2). 
As part of project risk management, project managers identify, analyse and respond to risk that may or 
may not occur as predicted. Pablo (1999, p. 102) and Jemison (1987, p. 1088) argued that risk is an ex 
ante construct (planned risk), which leads to an actual ex post outcome (actual risk). Planned risk can 
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be lower or greater than the actual risk (Ritchie & Marshall, 1993). Project managers may attach 
greater risk to a project than the project actually inherits or they may predict greater effects than 
actually exist. That is, in the process of project risk management, project managers may misestimate 
risks. Project managers can misestimate risk in two ways: they can first under- and/or second 
overestimate risk. The underestimation of risks could adversely influence a project outcome if threats 
arise that project managers did not identify in advance or have greater than expected consequence on 
the project outcome. On the other hand, project managers may overestimate risk, as project managers 
predict threats that do not materialise, do materialise but with lower predicted consequence or are met 
with a response that has a higher effect than actually necessary.  
4. RESEARCH INTO FACTORS LEADING TO OVER- AND 
UNDERESTIMATION OF RISK 
When project risk management is used, problems in its application tend to arise. Some researchers 
reported that project managers have difficulties in analysing risks (e.g. Bryne & Cadman, 1984; Teo, 
Quah, Torrance, & Okoro, 1991). Building upon previous research, Kutsch and Hall (2006) conducted 
an investigation into the kinds of barriers or intervening conditions, defined as risk-related factors 
interfering with the orderly management of project risk by project managers, which impacted on the 
effective management of project risk in IT projects. In the analysis of a number of in-depth interviews, 
they established a five-fold typology, describing intervening conditions that intervened or interrupted 
the rational management of risk during their projects. Those intervening conditions show a high 
degree of similarity to the problems that were identified in the literature review. These are summarised 
in Table 1.  
Intervening 
conditions 
Definition Description 
Denial of 
risk 
The refusal by risk 
actors to reveal risks 
to other stakeholders 
that may hold negative 
or discomforting 
connotations.  
Risk as a “taboo 
Denial of risk in order not to expose stakeholders to something 
perceived as negative. 
Denial of risk in order not to jeopardise long-term relationship with 
stakeholders. 
Denial of risk in order not to be perceived as a "doomsayer". 
Denial of risk in order to present the project as being "certain" and 
“certainly” successful for stakeholders. 
Avoidance 
of risk1  
Lack of attention to 
risks  
Lack of trust in risks  
Avoidance of risk because of mistrust between risk actors. 
Avoidance of risk because of colliding confidence levels about risk 
estimates between risk actors. 
Avoidance of risk because of colliding perceptions of risk actors about 
the legitimacy to manage certain risks. 
Delay of 
risk 
Failure to consider or 
proactively resolve 
risk  
Colliding risk management preference  
Delay of risk because of different expectations of risk actors about 
how to manage risk (proactive or reactive). 
Being 
ignorant of 
risk 
Incomplete knowledge 
of risk  
Lack of information  
Ignorance of risk because of the inability to scan and interpret the 
environment. 
Ignoring 
risk 
 Ignorance of risk because of deliberate limited scanning of the 
environment. 
Table 1: Overview of intervening conditions 
In the typology shown in Table 1, denial of risk by risk actors relates information that project 
stakeholders found troubling because of its discomforting character. Avoidance of risk, on the other 
                                                       
1 Not to be mistaken with avoidance as a risk response strategy 
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hand, applies to risks estimates that are conflicting. Delay of risk emphasises the preference of risk 
actors to adopt a reactive approach to risk management and to wait until risk resolves itself. Finally, 
the intervening condition of ‘being ignorant’ describes the action of risk actors of ‘ignoring’, the 
deliberate inattention of project managers towards risk. It is different from ‘being ignorant of risk’ in 
that project managers may be aware of risks, but they may exclude them from management as they are 
considered beyond the scope of their responsibility.  
Intervening conditions as described above appear to constrain project managers in their ability to 
effectively manage risk. They pose “barriers to preventive action” (Adler, Kegeles, & Genevro, 1992, 
p. 234). Lack of knowledge, for example, as a criterion of being ignorant of uncertainty seems to lead 
to risks being overlooked by project managers. Overall, this intervening condition imposes a constraint 
on the management of risk by project managers despite the benefits of managing risks for the purpose 
of reducing uncertainty (with the possibility of adverse consequences on the project performance). 
These mediators may be not be created deliberately by risk actors but can also be described as 
“affective impulses” (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002, p. 10). As Freudenberg (1992, p. 
249) suggests: “Instead, the problem is that a variety of factors that are far more subtle - unseen, 
unfelt, and yet unfortunate in their consequences - exert an influence that could scarcely be more 
disturbing even if they were based on deliberate malice”. 
Regarding the issue of over- and underestimating risk, few attempts have been made to investigate the 
discrepancy between predicted or planned risk and actual risk or the over- and underestimation of risk. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) investigated the impact of individuals’ experiences of event on their 
estimation of similar future events. Those with a more recent experience tend to believe that the events 
will be more likely to happen again, therefore overestimating its probability of occurring. Estrada 
(2000), for example, came to the conclusion that investors investing in the European securities market 
underestimated the risk of stock returns. Other results indicate, that individuals overestimate low risks 
and underestimate high risks (Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978). 
Misestimating risk and their probabilities has also been the subject of other studies. Wright and Ayton 
(1989) come to the conclusion that personal events which could unfold within a time frame of four 
weeks were associated with an increased probability. Milburn (1978) focused on non-personal events 
and argues that in the last four decades undesirable events were considered to occur less likely. 
Nevertheless, the findings of these and other studies show first that there is little agreement among 
researchers whether and to what extent individuals tend to over- or underestimate risks. Second, such 
studies mostly assess under- and overestimation of the probability of events occurring, but taking into 
account that risks include three dimensions (threat, consequence, response) they neglect to determine 
whether consequences and especially responses were under- and overestimated. Third, the findings fall 
short in explaining the effectiveness of project managers in accurately estimating risk in the specific 
research context of IT projects. The studies were mainly conducted in research contexts significantly 
different to the one in this study. Finally, such studies fail to explain the influence of risk related 
intervening conditions such as these described before on the project manager’s degree of over- and 
underestimation of risk. Hence, as shown in Figure 1, this study aims to investigate to what extent 
intervening conditions lead to the project manager’s perception of over- and underestimating risk. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
The investigation of whether and to what extent intervening conditions constrain the IT project 
manager in effectively predicting risk is of importance as over- and underestimated risk may 
ultimately influence the project outcome. 
5. METHODOLOGY 
5.1. Research Context 
The research problem was empirically investigated in the context of IT projects within organisations 
such as Computer Service Providers (CSP). Firms in this line of business included Unisys and IBM as 
stand-alone providers. In addition, many firms have this function provided as an in-house support 
function. Typical services that are provided, include “planning, operation, implementation and use of 
computer hardware, computer software and computer personnel” (Howard, 2001, p. 2). Examples of 
projects include ‘Roll Outs’, the implementation of ‘User Help Desk’ structures or ‘Outsourcing’ 
projects. In 2001 in the UK, services alone represented £20 billion in turnover for the stand-alone 
CSPs of which approximately 50% of this service volume were delivered through project work 
(Howard, 2001, p. 8) with the help of project risk management. 
5.2. Sample 
The sample of respondents for the survey stage was determined randomly using a cluster sample. The 
unit or cluster in the first pilot stage of the explanatory phase included two CSPs. The sample size for 
the pilot survey was approximately 70; the population of which consisted of project managers in IT 
related projects who are employed for one particular CSP. The second cluster sample in the main stage 
of the survey was composed of 2200 project managers who are member of the Project Management 
Institute Risk Management Specific Interest Group (RiskSig) and the specific risk interest group of the 
Association for Project Management. Slightly less than a third of these registered project managers, 
approximately 750, are specialists in conducting IT projects and these were invited to take part in the 
survey. A total of 102 useable responses were received, a response rate of more than 7%. 
The profile of the sample is shown in Table 2. The sample consisted predominantly of IT project 
managers involved in Roll Out projects. Such projects include the implementation of computer 
systems. This implementation may involve the installation of hard- and software and often the 
migration of data from an old to a new system. Furthermore, a relative high number of projects lasted 
between 6 – 12 months. The minimum value of the projects was £47,000, with the majority of projects 
being in excess of £1m. 
 Number of  
IT project manager  
involved 
Percentage 
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Type of project   
Outsourcing 16 15.7 
Implementation of user help desk structures 3 2.9 
Software development 24 23.5 
Roll Out 39 38.2 
Other types of IT projects 20 19.6 
Time Frame   
> 24 months 26 25.5 
12 – 24 months 20 19.6 
6 – 12 months 32 31.4 
< 6 months 24 23.5 
Project Value   
> £1,000,000 46 45.1 
£100,000 - £1,000,000  39 38.2 
£10,000 - £100,000 14 13.7 
< £10,000 3 2.9 
Table 2: Profile of sample 
In each case, the survey participants were asked to respond to a list of questions regarding whether the 
project they were currently involved with, or their most recent project. 
5.3. Design 
Project managers may attach greater risk to a project than the project actually merits. In the process of 
project risk management, project managers may misestimate risks, their ex ante estimation about risk 
may be lower or higher that the ex post outcome of risks (actual influence of risk on the project 
outcome).   
The degree of misestimating risk, that is to say the divergence between ex ante estimated and ex post 
materialised risk can be determined by its degree of over- and underestimation. Bearing Milliken’s 
recommendation to distinguish between three types of uncertainty in mind, underestimation of risk (ex 
ante estimated risk < ex post outcome of risk) by the project manager implies, that  
  either uncertainties with probable negative effects have not been identified but actually 
materialised, and/or probabilities have been assessed as lower than their actual value 
(underestimation of state uncertainty) 
  and/or consequences of identified uncertainties have been assessed as lower than their actual value 
(underestimation of effect uncertainty), 
  and/or responses have a lesser impact than predicted (underestimation of response uncertainty).  
Overestimation of risk (ex ante estimated risk > ex post outcome of risk) by the project manager 
means that  
  uncertainties have been identified but not actually materialised and/or probabilities have been 
assessed as higher than their actual value (overestimation of state uncertainty),  
  and/or consequences of identified uncertainties have been assessed as higher than their actual 
value (overestimation of effect uncertainty),  
  and/or responses have a bigger impact than predicted (overestimation of response uncertainty).  
In terms of design of the survey, respondents were asked to answer to what extent six types of over- 
and underestimation occurred in their IT project on a Likert Scale 1 (not at all) – 5 (to a great extent). 
In detail, the questions about the degree of over- and underestimations were stated as follows: “To 
what extent a) did predicted risk events actually NOT materialise? b) were the actual consequences of 
risk events MORE severe than predicted? c) were the actual consequences of risk events LESS severe 
than predicted? d) did actual risk mitigation actions BETTER than predicted? e) did actual risk 
mitigation actions WORSE than predicted? f) unpredicted risk events actually materialise?” 
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Concerning the intervening conditions, the questions were derived from a previous study investigating 
intervening conditions (Kutsch et al., 2006). The respondents were questioned as to what extent those 
intervening conditions occurred in their projects. Specifically, they were asked to what extent risks 
were perceived as being uncomfortable for one or more project stakeholders (denial of risk), outside 
the scope of risk management (ignoring risk), not agreed on by one or more stakeholders (avoidance 
of risk), managed once they materialised rather than before (delay of risk), and not visible until they 
materialised (being ignorant of risk).  
6. FINDINGS 
Concerning each intervening condition influencing the application of project risk management, Table 
3 provides an overview of the extent to which each intervening condition occurred in the investigated 
projects. 
Variable Mean (SD) 
Denial of risk  3.59 (1.15) 
Ignoring risk  3.00 (1.20) 
Avoidance of risk  2.65 (1.89) 
Delay of risk  3.18 (1.23) 
Being ignorant of risk  3.12 (1.27) 
Table 3: Mean values of intervening conditions variables (Scale: 1 – not at all, 5 – to a great extent) 
On average, most of the intervening conditions apart from avoidance, occurred “to some extent”. The 
next step is to determine the relationship between intervening conditions (see Table 4). 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1 Denial of risk 1    
2 Ignoring risk .047 1   
3 Avoidance of risk .124 .207 1  
4 Delay of risk .046 .434** .278** 1 
6 Being ignorant of risk -.093 .294** .271* .473** 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level  
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level  
Table 4: Correlations between intervening risk conditions  
Denial of risk is not significantly correlated with other intervening conditions. However, both types of 
ignorance of risk are significantly correlated with delay of risk, while avoidance of risk is less 
significantly related with Being ignorant of risk and delay of risk. Although it is difficult to determine 
which variable causes which (George & Mallery, 2003), risk actors’ attention towards reactive risk 
management or the mere inattention towards proactive project risk management is likely to lead to the 
ultimate ignorance of risks. Project managers may not even attempt to identify threats for the reason 
that they are not interested in pursuing a proactive risk management approach. Hence, delay of risk 
may ultimately trigger ignorance of risk by risk actors.  
A factor analysis resulted in the extraction of one factor including the variables of ignoring risk, 
avoidance of risk, delay of risk and being ignorant of risk can be extracted. Denial of risk as a variable 
was dropped. However, no conceptual reason behind this decision can be stated with confidence. 
Regarding the concepts of over- and underestimation, their mean scores are displayed in Table 5: 
Variable Mean (SD) 
Underestimation of state risk  3.23 (1.13) 
Underestimation of effect risk  2.97 (1.28) 
Underestimation of response risk  3.06 (1.49) 
Overestimation of state risk  2.99 (1.18) 
Overestimation of effect risk  2.53 (1.31) 
Overestimation of response risk  3.34 (1.32) 
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Table 5: Mean values of over- and underestimation of risk variables(Scale: 1 – not at all, 5 – to a 
great extent)  
Apart from overestimation of response risk, project managers tended to under- and overestimate risk 
to some extent. Their predictions about the existence of threats effect and responses tended to vary 
from the actual threats, effects and responses. The findings regarding the degree of over- and 
underestimation may reflect the lack of effectiveness and the level of difficulty project managers 
encountered during the process of managing risks.  
While the results of underestimation of state, effect risk and overestimation of state and response risk 
are similar, the amount of overestimation of effect risk is significantly lower. This could be explained 
by the fact that due to the pressure to portray an IT project in a positive light, the effects of risks were 
kept to a minimum. 
A subsequent step before the factor analysis was to determine the correlation between all over- and 
underestimation of risk variables (see Table 6). 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Underestimation of state risk  1     
2 Underestimation of effect risk  .371** 1    
3 Underestimation of response risk  .291** .234** 1   
4 Overestimation of state risk  .181 .154 .203 1  
5 Overestimation of effect risk  -.185 .150 -.027 .344** 1 
6 Overestimation of response risk  -.165 -.103 .099 .303** .334** 
**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level  
*. Correlation is significant at the .05 level  
Table 6: Correlations between over- and underestimation of risk variables 
The results show that all overestimation of risk variables and all underestimation of risk variables are 
significantly related. A factor analysis underlined this pattern of correlations. The first factor or 
composite consists of all three underestimations of risk, the second of all overestimation of risk 
variables. 
In the previous sections, I provided descriptive statistics about the means and relationship of variables 
used in the survey and the extraction of composite variables. This section is concerned with providing 
an overview of the composite variables and the analysis of how the developed composite variables 
influence each other. Table 7 shows the means and the reliability Alpha factor of each composite 
variable. 
Variable Mean  
(Cronbach’s 
Alpha) 
Overestimation of risk composite 2.95 (0.647) 
Underestimation of risk composite 3.26 (0.524) 
Intervening conditions composite 2.98 (0.663) 
Table 7: Mean values and reliability analysis of composite variables (Scale: 1 – not at all, 5 – to a 
great extent) 
Overall, project managers thought to have over- and underestimated risk to some extent. Regarding the 
issue of external reliability is important in relation to multiple-item scales as part of the survey 
questionnaire (Bryman & Cramer, 2001). In this respect, the Cronbach’s Alpha was calculated. As a 
rule of thumb, scales with a Cronbach alpha over 0.8 (Bryman et al., 2001) are internally consistent; 
however this may decrease to 0.5 in exploratory research (e.g. Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 
1998). The results of the reliability analysis show, that except for the underestimation of risk 
composite all coefficients are over 0.5, therefore showing a satisfying reliability. 
As the final step, regressions were run to identify the causal relationship between the composite factor 
of over- and underestimation of risk and risk related intervening conditions. As can be seen in Table 8, 
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the composite variables of over- and underestimation and intervening conditions have been defined as 
the dependent variables. 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent variables Overestimation of risk composite Underestimation of risk composite 
Intervening conditions composite .330 .417*** 
   
R
2
 .012 .174 
Adjusted R
2
 -.001 .164 
F  .111 16.252*** 
Regression coefficients are standardised.  *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
Table 8: Regressions on perceived effectiveness, over- and underestimation of risk and intervening 
conditions composite variable  
The findings on the influence of intervening conditions of delay, ignorance and avoidance of risk on 
over- and underestimation of risk state that intervening conditions significantly and positively affect 
the degree of underestimation of risk. The non-significant relationship between intervening conditions 
and overestimation of risk remains open to debate. However, one possible explanation is that due to 
the influence of intervening conditions, risks are downplayed and (deliberately) overlooked rather than 
vice versa. 
7. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
PMI and other organisations such as the Association of Project Management argue that their project 
management processes are generally accepted as best practice standards, thus implying a widespread 
consensus about the effectiveness of their processes. Williams (2004) argued that project management 
is a self-evidently correct discipline. However, the findings revealed that the application of project risk 
management is thought to be less effective from the IT project manager’s point of view, that is to say, 
to precisely predict and manage project risks. The findings show that risk related intervening 
conditions have a significant adverse impact on the project outcome. Consequently, the underlying 
assumptions of the project risk management process and the degree of rationality assumed according 
to EUT can be questioned. 
Due to the influence of intervening conditions, risks may always remain inadequately managed and 
cause disruptions to projects. Two suggestions to compensate for the impact of materialised risk are 
firstly, the arrangement of multi-layer reserves to absorb the impact of unforeseen events (Pender, 
2001) and secondly, adding contingencies to establish a fit between the environment and the project’s 
structural and process characteristics (Barki, Rivard, & Talbot, 2001). The adaptation to unforeseen 
situations may include project managers being flexible and dealing with situations only as they arise 
and with information only when it becomes available (Pavlak, 2004). With the prospect of 
unsuspected changes in the project, the project manager may want to prepare himself to be able to 
react to any unpredicted disruptions in the project. In this respect, flexibility is considered an 
important way of dealing with risk (e.g. Carlsson, 1989; Dreyer & Gronhaug, 2004; Eppink, 1978; 
Gustavsson, 1984; Holt, 2002; Leuuw & Volbreda, 1996; Sharfman & Dean, 1997; Slack & Correa, 
1992). In project management, flexibility is considered to be a critical success factor. However, 
although the concept of flexibility addresses residual risk caused by intervening conditions on the 
management of risk, it has been given little attention in project risk management literature so far 
(Hornby, 2001). 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, the extent to which project managers in IT projects under- and overestimated risk and 
what factors caused their failure to accurately predict risk was investigated. The degree of 
underestimation shows that the effectiveness of project risk management was not optimal, that is to 
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say, IT project managers failed to minimise the degree of over- and underestimation of risk. It appears 
that because of the apparent tendency towards underestimation of risk in IT projects by risk actors, 
risks are under regulated. One could argue that project managers should increase their degree of 
‘precaution’. However, to what degree an increased precaution may enable IT project managers to 
achieve their project objectives remains open to debate .  
As in any other survey research, a research strategy related limitation concerns the aspect of “positive 
bias” of the respondents. Interviewed project managers might have given information about mediators 
and risk actions in IT projects, which in retrospect are often seen in a more positive light by them than 
at the time those mediators occurred and actions were taken. IT project managers may have chosen to 
present their applied project risk management in a better perspective in order not to be considered by 
the interviewee as a ‘bad’ project manager. If this is confirmed to be true, the degree of over- and 
underestimation may be even greater.  
In addition, the accuracy of the scales used in this research remains open to debate. The scale 
development was predominantly based on the initial exploratory results and relied far less on existing 
empirical evidence due to the scarcity and insufficient credibility of existing measurements. 
Inadequate scale development of the intervening condition of denial of uncertainty may have resulted 
in its exclusion from the intervening condition composite. Even with the inclusion of the denial of 
uncertainty as a separate variable, regressions revealed that denial of uncertainty does not have a 
significant influence on any of the used variables. Possible inadequateness in accurately developing a 
scale for the intervening condition of denial of uncertainty may have resulted in the insignificance of 
this type of intervention. 
A limitation regarding the level of generality relates firstly, to the sample that included a narrow 
segment of project managers; those IT project managers, who were members of the professional 
organisation of PMI. Second, limited generalisabilty arises through the use of subjective data. The IT 
project manager’s reality which has been investigated in this study may not be transferable to other 
individuals. Consequently, tendencies which have emerged and been tested about concepts such as 
intervening conditions cannot be generalised beyond the chosen sample cluster (Bryman, 2001; 
Robson, 2002). In these circumstances, the degree of generalisation is limited to the respondents of the 
survey, thus these findings may only apply to the IT project managers who were part of the cluster 
sample and not to any other IT project manager or project manager involved in projects such as 
construction or pharmaceutical projects. 
Further research may investigate the influence of intervening conditions in other research context such 
as construction industry. In addition, the impact of under- and overestimation of risk on the actual 
project outcome as suggested in the conceptual framework (see Figure 1) could shed further light on 
the impact of the project manager’s inability to match perceived with actual risk. 
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